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1 Introduction 
Much has been written on the failure of judicial management1 as a 
business rescue model in South Africa. While it is generally accepted that 
judicial management is a dismal failure in practice,2 the question remains 
as to what will be done in order to rectify the position in South Africa, 
especially considering the premium that government has now placed on 
saving both jobs and businesses. 
Never before has South Africa been this well positioned to make work 
of rectifying an aspect of our insolvency laws that need a drastic 
overhaul. Although one finds it difficult to believe that the failure of large 
businesses in South Africa may in fact have a positive spin-off, it is 
submitted that the recent failures of large corporations such as Central 
News Agency ( C N A ) , Retail Apparel Group ( R A G ) and LeisureNet, has 
at last prompted government to take the necessary steps to bring about 
reform in the area of business rescue. It, of course, helps that South 
Africa is also currently nearing the end of a long process in reviewing its 
antiquated insolvency laws, with the unified version of a new Insolvency 
Act recently having been accepted by the South African Cabinet.3 
Business rescue and insolvency go hand-in-hand, and it makes sense to 
address these very important issues simultaneously. The Ministers of 
Justice and Trade and Industry have indicated that reform in the area of 
business rescue is imminent, although there appears to be some doubt as 
to which department will in fact take responsibility for the reform process 
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1
 Although compromises in terms of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 are also regarded as being a 
form of business rescue, these have not been discussed in any detail in this article. The reason for 
this is that s 311 compromises have been retained in the new proposed Draft Insolvency and 
Business Recovery Bill that was approved by the South African Cabinet on 5 March 2003. This 
article therefore concentrates on judicial management as the current form of business rescue in 
South Africa. However, in order to provide as much background as possible, a brief summary has 
been given on the various options available to debtors in order to reach some or other form of 
agreement with their creditors, as well as other more recent options that have been included. 
2
 For a judicial summary of the problems associated with judicial management in South Africa, 
see Le Roux Hotel Management (Ply) Ltd v E Rand (Ptv) Ltd 2001 (2) SA 727 (C); [2001] 1 A l l 
SA 233 (C). 
3
 The South African Cabinet approved the unified version of a new insolvency statute on 
5 Mar 2003. The proposed legislation has been submitted to the State Law Advisers under the title 
'Draft Insolvency and Business Recovery Bil l ' . 
241 
242 (2004) 16 SA Merc LJ 
itself. In the interim, and to be of possible assistance with the development 
of a new business rescue model for South Africa, the Centre for Advanced 
Corporate and Insolvency Law ( 'CACIL ' ) at the University of Pretoria 
thought it prudent to undertake a research project that can make 
recommendations to government regarding a modern and effective 
business rescue model. As a first step in this project the C A C I L hosted a 
workshop at the University of Pretoria at which the most important 
elements of a modern and effective business rescue model could be debated 
by all the stakeholders in the insolvency industry. 
This article has been adapted from the working document prepared for 
the workshop, and must not be seen to be the first or the last word on a 
modern and effective business rescue model for South Africa. Quite 
simply, the main purpose of this article is to explore some of the main 
elements of a modern and effective business rescue regime for South 
Africa. 
Consequently, in this article the following issues will be addressed, 
namely: 
• The background leading up to the current research into a modern and 
effective business rescue regime for South Africa. 
• The reasons for the failure of judicial management as a viable business 
rescue mechanism, and the lessons to be learnt from its failure. 
• Options, both old and new, that have been included in the Draft 
Insolvency and Business Recovery Bil l . 
• The underlying philosophy and meaning of 'business rescue'. 
• The main elements of a successful business rescue regime in the South 
African context. 
2 Background to Reform Initiatives 
During the late 1980s the South African Law Reform Commission 
( 'SALRC' ) undertook an initiative to totally review the Insolvency Act 24 
of 1936 ('the Insolvency Act'). At the initial stages of the review process 
the Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law, resorting under the 
auspices of the Department of Trade and Industry, was requested to 
simultaneously look at the reform of the winding-up provisions of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 ('the Companies Act') and the Close 
Corporations Act 69 of 1984 ('the Close Corporations Act'). However, 
nothing was done in this regard until 1998. The S A L R C published 
numerous research papers before being requested, during the mid 1990s, 
to hasten the project and to publish a Draft Insolvency Bill . The 
S A L R C ' s Draft Insolvency Bill was eventually published in 1996. 
In the meantime the Centre for Advanced Corporate and Insolvency 
Law at the University of Pretoria had offered to assist the Standing 
Advisory Committee on Company Law in bringing about the desired 
amendments also to the Companies Act and the Close Corporations Act. 
The suggestion was that the C A C I L would attempt to unify the winding-
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up provisions of the Companies Act and the Close Corporations Act, 
with those of the Draft Insolvency Bill published by the SALRC in 1996. 
In doing so the CACIL used the SALRC's Draft Insolvency Act as a 
point of departure, and a working document appeared in October 1998. 
This working document was subsequently discussed at a national 
symposium, attended by over 200 delegates from all disciplines of the 
insolvency profession. The overwhelming majority of the delegates were 
in favour of a unified Insolvency Act, but felt that some major 
amendments had to be made to the initial draft included in the working 
document. In order to achieve the necessary changes a series of 
workshops were held at the University of Pretoria during December 1998. 
In October 1999 a new version of. the Unified Insolvency Act was 
discussed at length at a technical conference. The delegates at this 
conference approved the new version of the Draft Unified Insolvency Bill 
with a few minor amendments. The final version of the Draft Unified 
Insolvency Bill, reflecting the sum total of the research conducted by the 
SALRC and the CACIL, was eventually presented to the SALRC in 
January 2000. 
On 5 March 2003 the Cabinet of the South African government 
approved the introduction of the Draft Insolvency and Business 
Recovery Bill, the name given to the unified version of the new 
Insolvency Act. This Bill is currently in the hands of the state law 
advisers, and the official Bill will hopefully be published sometime during 
2004. 
3 The Underlying Philosophy and Meaning of 'Business Rescue'4 
Before discussing the various aspects that will impact on the 
implementation of a workable business rescue regime in South Africa, 
it is perhaps appropriate to consider the meaning of the concept 'business 
rescue', and to explode some of the myths surrounding the general 
understanding of this concept in South Africa.5 
Despite its name, the purpose of business rescue is not necessarily to 
prevent a company or corporation from being wound up or liquidated.6 
4
 See, generally, Mui r Hunter 'The Nature and Functions of a Rescue Culture' 1999 J of 
Business Law 491; Michael R Rochelle 'Lowering the Penalties for Failure; Using the Insolvency 
Law as a Tool for Spurring Economic Growth; the American Experience, and Possible Uses for 
South Africa' (1996) 2 Tydskrifvir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 315; Ron W Harmer "Comparison of 
Trends in National Law: The Pacific R im ' 1997 (13) Brooklyn J of International Law 139-65; 
Royston Miles Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law 2 ed (1997) 267-70; Michael J 
Herbert Understanding Bankruptcy (1995) ch 17 at 303-52. For an instructive comment on the 
underlying philosophy of reorganisations under United States law, see Thomas H Jackson 77ie 
Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (1986) 209-24. For a useful and more recent discussion of the 
philosophy underlying rescues under English law, see Vanessa Finch Corporate Insolvency Law: 
Perspectives and Principles (2002) ch 6. For a useful summary of the concepts and theories that 
apply to business rescue generally, see Alice Belcher Corporate Rescue (1997) ch 1-6 at 3-87. 
Possibly due to the fact that judicial management in South Africa has as its aim the complete 
resuscitation of a company, many believe that all business rescue models have the same purpose. 
6
 The terms 'winding-up' and 'liquidation' are used interchangeably in this article, although in 
South Africa the draft (Unified) Insolvency and Business Recovery Bill intends using the term 
'liquidation' to denote the winding-up of the estates of all entities. 
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Even if the business cannot be restored to a solvent and profitable status, 
the return to creditors in the long-run will be much higher.7 It is stated 
thus by Smits:8 
'Modern "corporate rescue" and reorganisation seeks to take advantage of the reality 
that in many cases an enterprise not only has substantial value as a going concern, but its 
going concern value exceeds its l iquidation value. Through judicial bankruptcy 
procedures, reorganisation seeks to maximise, preserve and possibly even enhance the 
value o f a debtor's business enterprise, in order to maximise payment to the creditors of 
the distressed debtor.' 
An important point made by Harmer,9 is that a business rescue regime 
has a far better chance of succeeding if the insolvency system in which it is 
applied is debtor-friendly, as opposed to a creditor-friendly system of 
insolvency where business rescue regimes are not applied as successfully.10 
This is certainly true of South Africa. South Africa has a creditor-friendly 
insolvency system, and it is submitted that the fact that the courts take a very 
conservative approach to insolvency and judicial management is a 
contributing factor in the failure of judicial management as a business 
rescue regime in South Africa. This aspect will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
While judicial management, as an example of a business rescue 
mechanism in South Africa, is seen to be an extraordinary measure, in 
other jurisdictions business rescue procedures are seen as a necessary and 
natural precursor to insolvency itself.'' In this regard it is important to 
note the legal nature and philosophy behind a business rescue culture. In 
the so-called Cork Report,12 the following two aims 'of a good modern 
insolvency law' were identified with regard to English law:13 
7
 Section 427(1) of the Companies Act requires that there must be a reasonable probability that 
the company will be able to pay its debts and meet its obligations if the judicial management order 
is granted. In Noordkaap Lewendehawe Ko-op Bpk v Schreuder 1974 (3) SA 102 (A), the Court 
confirmed the requirement that there must be a reasonable probability and not merely a 
reasonable possibility. The Court also stated that the intention of the legislature in using the term 
'probability' was to restrict as little as possible the rights o f creditors. This requirement is stated as 
being unrealistic, and sometimes even against the wishes of creditors, by Harry Rajak & Johan J 
Henning in 'Business Rescue for South Africa' (1999) 116 SALJ268. Anthony J Smits 'Corporate 
Administration: A Proposed Model ' (1999) 32 De Jure 86 is of the opinion that the success of 
judicial management should not be measured by this requirement, as this is not the only goal of a 
business rescue regime. See also Harmer op cit note 4 at 144 where he attempts to provide an 
internationally acceptable definition of the term 'rescue'. 
8
 Smits op cit note 7 at 83. See also Michael Trebilcock & Jodi Katz 'The Law and Economics 
of Corporate Insolvency: A North American Perspective' in: Rickett (ed) Essays on Corporate 
Restructuring and Insolvency (1996), where the following is stated at 7: 
'The collective interest of all creditors requires the maximisation of the aggregate value of the 
assets of the debtor. In many cases, an insolvent firm is worth more as a going concern than the 
sum value of its discrete assets sold on a piecemeal basis. In these situations, it is in the collective 
interests of all creditors that the business be preserved as a going concern.' 
' Op cit note 4 at 147. 
10
 Ibid where Harmer refers to the United States as an example of a debtor-friendly insolvency 
system where business rescue has a very high success rate, as opposed to Australia with a low rate 
of success due to its creditor-friendly insolvency system. But this has changed since the 
introduction of a new business rescue model - corporate voluntary administration - in Australia: 
see also Finch op cit note 4 at 189. 
" See, eg, Herbert op cit note 4 at 303-14 where the author discusses the role of business rescue 
in the United States. 
'" Insolvency Law and Practice, Report of the Review Committee (Cmnd 8558) 1982 ("the Cork 
Report'). 
" Idem in par 198. 
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'(0 to recognise that the effects of insolvency are not limited to the private interests of the 
insolvent and his creditors, but that other interests of society or other groups in society 
are vitally affected by the insolvency and its outcome, and to ensure that these public 
interests are recognised and safeguarded; 
(/) to provide means for the preservation of viable commercial enterprises capable of 
making a useful contribution to the economic life of the country;' 
In addition to these statements on the general aims of English 
insolvency law, the Cork Report stated the following in regard to the 
appointment of administrators as a form of business rescue:,4 
'498. Under our proposals, an Administrator may be appointed for all or any of the 
following reasons: 
(a) to consider the reorganisation of the company and its management with a view to 
restoring profitability or maintaining employment; 
(h) to ascertain whether a company of doubtful solvency can be restored to profitability; 
(c) to make proposals for the most profitable realisation of assets for the benefit of 
creditors and shareholders; 
(a) to carry on the business where this is in the public interest but is unlikely that the 
business can be continued under the existing management.' 
In determining what the actual meaning of a 'rescue culture' is,15 
Hunter provides the following explanation:16 
'What then [is meant] by the term "rescue culture"? It is a multi-aspect concept, having 
both a positive and protective role, and a corrective and a punitive role. On one level, it 
manifests itself by legislative and judicial policies, directed to the more benevolent 
treatment of insolvent persons, whether they be individuals or corporations, and at the 
same time to a more draconian treatment of true economic delinquents. On another level, it 
entails the adoption of a general rule for the construction of statutes, which is deliberately 
inclined towards the giving of a positive and socially profitable meaning (rather than a 
negative or socially destructive meaning), to statutes of socio-economic import. Of such 
statutes, insolvency legislation may justly be regarded as the paramount example.' 
3 Judicial Management as a Business Rescue Model in South 
Africa17 and Other Alternatives to Liquidation 
3.1 Introduction 
Although currently lagging behind most other modern insolvency 
systems when it comes to business rescue regimes, it is ironic that South 
Africa was one of the first countries to actually introduce a business 
14
 Idem in par 498. See also Goode op cit note 4 at 267-323 for a discussion of administration 
orders under English law. The so-called Harmer Report (Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Report No 45, General Insolvency Inquiry (1988)) followed similar principles when recommending 
the introduction of voluntary administration as a form of business rescue in Australia: see the 
Harmer Report ch 3. 
15
 See also Harmer op cit note 4 at 143-8 where he gives an exposition of the general principles 
that a business rescue culture should ascribe to. 
16
 Hunter op cit note 4 at 498. 
17
 See, generally, Smits op cit note 7 at 80; HS Cilliers, M L Benade, JJ Henning, JJ du Plessis & 
PA Delport Corporate Law 3 ed (2000) ch 26 at 477; Jennifer A Kunst (gen ed), Julian C King & 
Karl E Schmidt Henochsberg on the Companies Act (1994 loose-leaf edition) Vol 1 923-59; Pieter 
Kloppers 'Judicial Management Reform Steps to Initiate a Business Rescue' (2001) 13 SA Merc 
LJ 359; Pieter Kloppers 'Judicial Management A Corporate Rescue Mechanism in Need of 
Reform?' 1999 Stellenbosch LR 417; Rajak & Henning op cit note 7 at 262; David A Burdette 
'Unified Insolvency Legislation in South Africa: Obstacles in the Path of the Unification Process' 
(1999) 32 De Jure 44; Albert Henthorne Olver 'Judicial Management: A Case for Law Reform' 
(1986) 49 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 84; David A Burdette A Framework 
for Corporate Insolvency Law Reform in South Africa (unpublished LLD thesis, University of 
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rescue model in the form of judicial management.18 Unfortunately, since 
the introduction of judicial management in 1926, South Africa has not 
really developed its business rescue provisions any further, and 
consequently finds itself out of step with modern insolvency systems 
regarding this important aspect of insolvency law. While it is not the aim 
of this article to discuss judicial management in depth, a brief exposition 
of its mechanics will be given with specific reference to the problems 
encountered in a country that to a large extent has a liquidation culture. ,9 
Judicial management is provided for in ss 427 to 440 of the Companies 
Act. It is a process that can be used by a company that is experiencing a 
temporary financial setback as a result of mismanagement or other 
special circumstances, and that will lead to it once again becoming a 
successful business concern.20 This is achieved by replacing the existing 
management of the company with a judicial manager who takes over the 
company's business with the purpose of restoring it to profitability.21 
Judicial management was introduced into South African law by the 
Companies Act 46 of 1926, South Africa at the time being one of the first 
countries to introduce a business rescue regime.22 Judicial management 
has not changed very much over the years, although a few amendments 
have been made as a result of a number of commissions of inquiry. The 
most important of these amendments was introduced in 1932,23 and 
made provision for a moratorium on claims by creditors and introduced 
the principles of impeachable transactions to apply also to judicial 
management.24 Further minor amendments were made in 1939, as a 
result of the report by the Lansdown Commission,25 and 1952, following 
the report of the Mi l l in Commission.26 When the Van Wyk de Vries 
Commission27 was deliberating the consolidation of the Companies Act 
Pretoria (2002)) ch 10. For a discussion of the history of judicial management and its application 
by the courts, see Albert Henthorne Olver Judicial Management in South Africa (unpublished P h D 
thesis. University of Cape Town (1980)); and Le Roux Hotel Management v E Rand Ltd supra 
note 2. For a summary of the Le Roux Hotel Management case, see Patrick O'Brien & Andre 
Boraine 'Review of Case Law and Publications' 2001 South African Insolvency LR 25. 
18
 See Rajak & Henning op cit note 7 at 262. 
19
 It is interesting that David Milman & Chris Durrant Corporate Insolvency Law and Practice 
3 ed (1999) at 1 state that one of the aims of corporate insolvency is in fact to promote business 
rescue. See also Goode op cit note 4 at 267-70. 
20
 Section 427(1) of the Companies Act; Cilliers et al op cit note 17 at 478; Silverman v 
Doomhoek Mines Ltd 1935 T P D 349. 
21
 Cilliers et al op cit note 17 at 478. 
" Rajak & Henning op cit note 7 at 262. In the 1960s Australia imported judicial management 
into their legal system as a business rescue procedure, but used the term 'official management' 
instead of 'judicial management". However, as is the case currently in South Africa with judicial 
management, official management in Australia was a 'remarkable failure': see Harmer op cit note 
4 at 149. Harmer is of the opinion that the reason for official management's dismal failure as a 
business rescue regime, is that it requires all the debts of the ailing company to be repaid in full. 
23
 Companies Act Amendment Act 11 of 1932. 
24
 Rajak & Henning op cit note 7 at 265. 
25
 Report of the Companies Act Commission 1935-1936 ( U G 45 of 1936). 
~ Verslag van die Kommissie van Ondersoek insake die Wysiging van die Maatskappywel 
( U G 69 of 1948). 
27
 Kommissie van Ondersoek na die Maatskappywet (there were two reports, the main report 
(Hoofverslag R P 45/1970) and a supplementary report with a draft Bill (Aanvullende Verslag en 
Konsepwetsonlwerp R P 31/1972)). 
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in the early 1970s, the Masters of the Supreme Court28 called for the 
abolition of judicial management due to its low success rate.29 However, 
the Commission did not recommend the abolition of judicial manage-
ment and retained it under the new Companies Act of 1973. 
The popularity of modern business rescue regimes worldwide,30 and 
the fact that judicial management has not been very successful in South 
Africa, has of late resulted in a number of commentators calling for a 
review of South African business rescue procedures.31 However, at a 
conference held on 6 October 1999 where three different models for a new 
business rescue regime were submitted for consideration, delegates could 
not reach unanimity on the principles of such a new regime. The result 
was a rejection of all three models, with a call for proper research on the 
subject and proposals to be made sometime in the future.32 
Besides the existence of judicial management as a business rescue 
model in South Africa, there are, or soon will be, a number of possible 
alternatives to liquidation. Some of these alternatives have been in 
existence for some time, while others are relatively new or have been 
recently suggested. In order to make this article as complete as possible, 
these alternatives are mentioned (and briefly discussed) in par 3.3 below. 
3.2 The Main Problems Experienced with Judicial Management as 
a Business Rescue Model 
It is difficult to provide a brief exposition of a subject-area as wide as 
judicial management. Consequently only the most problematic aspects of 
judicial management will be discussed here. The main problem, it is 
submitted, lies in the fact that the courts in South Africa see judicial 
management as an extraordinary procedure, and not as a viable 
alternative to liquidation.33 Kloppers submits that this should not be 
As this office was known at the time - the name has subsequently been changed to the 
Master of the High Court. 
29
 Van Wyk de Vries Commission op cit note 27, par 51.02 at 147 of the main report; Rajak & 
Henning op cit note 7 at 266. 
30
 It is indisputable that business rescues have become the international buzzword. See Axel 
Flessner "Philosophies of Business Bankruptcy Law: An International Overview' in: Ziegel Jacobs 
(ed) Current Developments in International and Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law (1994) 20 
where he states: 
'Over time, and in all developed economies, the view came to prevail that bankruptcy law 
should offer not only straight liquidation but also reorganization, including a restructuring of 
debt and equity, as a solution to insolvency. The American Bankruptcy Act of 1938, with its 
chapters X and X I , was the first piece of legislation in a capitalist and free-market economy 
fully to incorporate this idea. Since then it has become commonplace in modern business 
bankruptcy legislation to provide for alternatives to piecemeal liquidation of insolvent 
enterprises." 
31
 See Rajak & Henning op cit note 7 at 264-5, 287; Rochelle op cit note 4 at 328-9; Smits op cit 
note 7 at 107; Kloppers op cit note 17 at 371-9. While most authors call for a whole new system of 
business rescue to be developed, Kloppers in both his articles points out that there is nothing 
wrong with judicial management; he is of the opinion that the current shortcomings in the system 
can be rectified by means of a few legislative amendments. 
32
 In terms of a recent communication by the Department of Trade and Industry, it would 
appear that this task will once again fall on the Centre for Advanced Corporate and Insolvency 
Law (CACIL) at the University of Pretoria. 
33
 Kloppers op cit note 17 at 378; Le Roux Hotel Management v E Rand Ltd supra note 2. 
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the case and states that there is nothing in the provisions themselves that 
indicate that this should be so.34 
In terms of s 427(1) of the Companies Act the granting of a judicial 
management order by a court rests on various requirements. These 
requirements are:35 
(a) If, by reason of mismanagement or any other cause 
(/) the company is unable to pay its debts or is probably unable to 
meet its commitments; and 
(ii) has not become, or is prevented from becoming, a successful 
business concern; and 
(b) there is a reasonable probability that, if the company is placed under 
judicial management, it will be in a position to 
(/) pay its debts or meet its obligations; and 
(ii) become a successful business concern, 
then a court may, i f it appears just and equitable, grant a judicial 
management order. 
Part (a) of the requirements relates to the state that a company finds 
itself in, and must be proved before an applicant wil l have locus standi to 
obtain a judicial management order. Part (b) of the requirements relates 
to what can be achieved by obtaining a judicial management order, and 
what needs to be proved before the court will grant the order. Even if the 
above requirements have been met, the court will not grant an order for 
judicial management if it does not appear to the court that it is just and 
equitable36 to do so. 
From our case law and the numerous articles that have been written on 
the subject of judicial management, it is submitted that the following 
main problems with judicial management as a viable business rescue 
regime can be identified: 
(a) Judicial management is seen as an extraordinary measure. The 
courts37 regard judicial management as an extraordinary measure due to 
" Kloppers op cit note 17 at 378. 
35
 With acknowledgement to Cilliers et al op cit note 17 at 480. 
36
 According to De Jager v Karoo Koeldranke & Roomys (Edms) Bpk 1956 (3) SA 594 (C). the 
court will consider the interests of both the creditors and the shareholders before deciding whether 
or not it is just and equitable to grant the judicial management order. See further Michael S 
Blackman sv 'Companies' in: W A Jouhert (ed) The Law of South Africa V o l 4 Part 3 (1996) at 460-
1. It has been held by our courts on more than one occasion that it is not just and equitable to 
grant a judicial management order where the parties seek to use the remedy in order to settle 
internal disputes: see Makhuva v Lukoto Bus Service (Pty) Ltd 1987 (3) SA 376 (V) and Ben-
Tovim v Ben-Tovim 2000 (3) SA 325 (C). 
37
 See, eg, Silverman v Doornhoek Mines Ltd 1935 T P D 349 at 353; Sammel v President Brand 
Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) at 663; and Tenowitz v Tenny Investments (Pty) Ltd 1979 
(2) SA 680 (E) at 683. This conservative approach of the courts was recently criticised in Le Roux 
Hotel Management v E Rand Ltd supra note 2. Before the introduction of voluntary 
administration, Australia too experienced a conservatism by the courts regarding business 
rescue. The Harmer Report op cit note 14 vol 1 stated it thus in par 52: 
'The Commission is also concerned that . . . the legislative approach to corporate insolvency in 
Australia is most conservative. There is very little emphasis upon or encouragement of a 
constructive approach to corporate insolvency by . . . focussing on the possibility of saving a 
business (as distinct from the company itself) and preserving employment prospects.' 
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the fact that a creditor of a company that is unable to pay its debts is entitled 
to make use of liquidation in order to recover payment of its claim.38 
(b) The requirement that there must be a 'reasonable probability' that 
the company will become a successful concern.39 There has been some 
debate as to whether this test is the same at the time the provisional and 
final orders are considered, or whether the test should be more stringent 
upon the return date of the order. Stated differently, the question is 
whether the test should be more stringent once the provisional judicial 
manager has had time to investigate the affairs of the company and 
report back to the court.40 In Tenowitz v Tenny Investments (Pty) Ltd41 
the Court found that something more than a 'reasonable probability' is 
required before it can grant a final judicial management order. However, 
from cases such as Ex parte Onus (Edms) Bpk: Du Plooy v Onus (Edms) 
Bpk42 Kotze v Tulryk Bpk43 and LadybrandHotel (Pty) Ltd v Segal44 it 
is evident that the courts reasoned that the test upon the granting of a 
final order should be the same as in the case of a provisional order. This 
latter view is supported by Kloppers45 and Kunst,46 although Olver47 
believes that a stricter test should be employed.48 
(c) Reliance on court proceedings.49 Kloppers argues that this is one of 
the most important drawbacks of the current judicial management 
system, stating that the cost of running a judicial management is hardly a 
financially sound one. The costs incurred in running the process are so 
high that it does not make the process attractive for the creditors, as all 
the available funds are spent on the process itself.50 
38
 This right of creditors was described in Tenowitz v Tenny Investments Ltd supra note 37 at 
683 as a right 'ex debito justitiae' to liquidate the company. 
39
 See Kloppers op cit note 17 at 362-3. This requirement is in my opinion also one of the 
reasons why judicial management cannot be successfully implemented in South Africa, and has 
been criticised as being outdated and unrealistic: see Rajak & Henning op cit note 7 at 267; and 
Smits op cit note 7 at 82-4. It is submitted that the burden of proof is too onerous, and that the 
test should rather be one of a 'reasonable possibility", 
40
 See Tenowitz v Tenny Investments Ltd supra note 37 at 683; Kunst et al op cit note 17 at 926; 
Blackman op cit note 36 at 459; Cilliers et al op cit note 17 at 481 where it is stated that upon the 
return day the court will be in a better position to assess whether or not the company has a chance 
of becoming a successful concern. 
41
 Supra note 37. 
42
 1980 (4) SA 63 (O). 
43
 1977 (3)SA 118 (T). 
44
 1975 (2) SA 357 (O). 
45
 Kloppers op cit note 17 at 363. 
46
 Kunst et al op cit note 17 at 926. 
47
 Olver op cit note 17, with reference to an unreported decision in annexure IV, sc In re Olver: 
Intafine Leasing & Finance (Ply) Ltd (unreported, C P D , 16 Feb 1977, case no M1830/76). 
4
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Kloppers op cit note 17 at 425. 
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(d) The insolvency requirement.51 Section 427(l)(a) of the Companies 
Act contains a strict requirement that the company must be unable to pay 
its debts before a judicial management order may be granted. Kloppers 
argues that insolvency or pending insolvency should not be a requirement 
as it not only acts as a bar for its more general use, but it also defeats the 
object of the exercise, namely staving off insolvency and making the 
company profitable again.52 He submits further that the earlier a 
company enters judicial management for assistance, the better chance 
there is that it will become a successful concern.53 
(e) The use of liquidators as judicial managers.54 Olver states that it is 
ludicrous to appoint liquidators as judicial managers, as they have been 
trained to liquidate companies and not save them.55 Besides the conflict 
of interests that liquidators might often have in such a case, the structure 
of the fees is also seen by Olver as a problem.56 Rajak and Henning57 
share the view that the wrong people are being used as judicial managers 
and suggest that a panel of retired or semi-retired businesspeople should 
be employed in order to oversee the rescue procedure, whatever form it 
takes. 
(/') The fact that judicial management procedures only apply to 
companies. Currently the provisions relating to judicial management only 
apply to companies, and not to close corporations, partnerships or 
business trusts. Some doubt has been expressed by our courts as to 
whether or not the provisions relating to judicial management should be 
applied to small companies, for example, private companies with only a 
few members.58 However, in Tobacco Auctions Ltd v AW Hamilton (Pvt) 
Ltd59 the Court stated that there is no reason why the provisions cannot 
be held to apply also to small companies. The Court further stated that 
one should not look at the size of the company, but rather at the extent 
and scope of its business activities, its assets and liabilities and the nature 
of its difficulties.60 
While the above exposition does not cover all the aspects relating to 
judicial management, it does shed some light on the problems that make 
judicial management an unattractive option as an effective business 
rescue regime within the South African context. 
51






 See, generally, Olver op cit note 17 at 84. 
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 Idem at 87. 
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 Idem at 84. 
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 Rajak & Henning op cit note 7 at 282-5. 
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 See, eg, Rustomjee v Rustomjee (Pty) Ltd 1960 (2) SA 753 (D) 758 where the Court stated 
that it is doubtful whether judicial management proceedings are appropriate to small private 
companies. 
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 1966 (2) SA 451 (R) at 453. 
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 At 453. It is submitted that what the Court was saying, is that one should look to see whether 
it would be just and equitable to place the company under judicial management. This is a separate 
requirement under judicial management and has already been discussed above. 
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3.3 Other Business Rescue Mechanisms 
3.3.1 Compromises in Terms of Section 311 of the Companies Act 
In terms of s 311 of the Companies Act a company may enter into a 
compromise with its creditors.61 This is a court-driven process where the 
eventual compromise must be sanctioned by both the creditors and 
the court. Consequently it is an expensive procedure to implement, 
and the plethora of case law regarding these compromises indicates that it 
is not always a simple undertaking. 
The introduction of a capital gains tax in October 2001 has apparently 
also had a negative impact on s 311 compromises, although the reasons 
for this will not be explored in this article. 
Section 311 compromises have been included under the Unified 
Insolvency and Business Recovery Bill in a revised form. The revised 
form entails the separation of the provisions dealing with a compromise 
between the company and its creditors from those dealing with schemes 
of arrangement between the company and its members (the latter 
provisions will remain in the Companies Act). In addition, the provisions 
have also been made applicable to business trusts and close corporations. 
3.3.2 Pre-Liquidation Compositions 
As part of its review of South African insolvency law in the 1990s, the 
South African Law Reform Commission suggested that an alternative to 
sequestration should be provided to debtors in the form of a composition 
that could be entered into outside the confines of formal insolvency. The 
submission was made in the form of an insertion to the Magistrates' 
Courts Act 32 of 1944, namely s 74X. Upon drafting the Unified 
Insolvency and Business Recovery Bill it was decided that such a 
composition, termed a 'pre-liquidation composition', should be included 
in the unified Bill instead of in the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944. 
This proposal was accepted and the Unified Insolvency and Business 
Recovery Bill now contains a chapter dealing with pre-liquidation 
compositions. The provisions were subsequently amended to apply to any 
type of debtor, and not only to natural persons and partnerships. The 
advantage of this type of composition is the fact that it can be dealt with 
in the lower courts, which has positive financial implications for 
struggling debtors. 
3.3.3 Informal Creditor Workouts 
Although not formally regulated in terms of legislation, informal 
creditor workouts seem to have taken root in South African commerce. 
These informal creditor workouts entail large financial institutions 
61
 In terras of this section it is also possible for the company to enter into a scheme of 
arrangement with its members, but this aspect of s 311 will not be dealt with here. 
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joining forces to provide ailing companies with the necessary financial 
assistance to trade themselves out of their difficulties. By joining forces 
the risk is spread, and no single institution has to carry the full burden 
should the informal reorganisation ultimately fail. The lack of legislative 
provisions supporting such informal creditor workouts does, however, 
limit their use in practice. One of the greatest drawbacks of this system is 
that it does not bind other creditors, and they are consequently free to 
apply for the liquidation of the debtor in appropriate circumstances. This 
type of business rescue mechanism and its continued use in the South 
African context is mentioned again in par 4 below. 
3.3.4 The Application of Winding-up Provisions to Bring about a 
Business Rescue 
The most recent proposal for a possible business rescue mechanism was 
made in the latter part of 2003 by a firm of attorneys based in 
Johannesburg. Without going into too much detail,62 the proposal entails 
the appointment of a 'turnaround expert' as the provisional liquidator, 
who can then use the provisions of various pieces of legislation, including 
the winding-up provisions of the Companies Act and the provisions of 
the Insolvency Act, in order to attempt to save the ailing company. This 
proposal is dependent on the court granting a return date of sufficient 
length on the provisional order to allow the turnaround expert enough 
time to investigate the affairs of the company, and to report back to the 
court as to whether the company can be saved or whether the provisional 
liquidation order should be made final. This proposed method of 
business rescue was suggested as an interim measure only, to operate until 
such time as a new business rescue model can be developed and 
implemented. 
This method of business rescue is applied in similar form to ailing 
companies in Hong Kong, but its use there is due to the total lack of 
formal business rescue provisions (they do not even have a defective 
business rescue model such as judicial management). It also needs to be 
stated that the courts in Hong Kong have much wider powers than their 
South African counterparts when granting a winding-up order, and it is 
therefore within their powers to grant the provisional liquidator with the 
requisite powers to attempt a turnaround of the business concerned. 
A n article of this nature cannot do justice to the many facets of this 
new proposal, and consequently no attempt will be made to do so. Suffice 
it to state that it is encouraging to know that there are practitioners in 
South Africa who are prepared to take an innovative approach to 
business rescue. It is this type of commitment that will ensure the ultimate 
62
 It is difficult, at this stage, to provide sufficient detail as the proposals are in a state of flux. 
The proposals were due to be implemented on 1 April 2004, but this did not take place as further 
refinement of the provisions was apparently required. 
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success of business rescue mechanisms in South Africa as a viable 
alternative to liquidation. 
3.3.5 Conclusion 
Despite the existence of the alternatives to liquidation that have been 
enumerated above, there appears to be general consensus that South 
Africa needs, and wants, a modern and effective business rescue model. It 
is for this reason that the remainder of this article addresses the main 
elements of a modern and workable business rescue regime that can be 
tailor-made to cater for the South African economy and its legislative 
framework. 
4 The UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law63 
4.1 Introduction 
UNCITRAL recently released their latest draft legislative guidelines on 
insolvency law, and while the document is not yet in its final form it does 
set out very clearly the generic provisions that UNCITRAL regard as 
being important when drafting insolvency laws (including business rescue 
provisions) under any jurisdiction. 
In an effort to comply with these guidelines as closely as possible when 
designing a new business rescue model for South Africa, many of the 
guidelines (as they apply to business rescue) have been summarised under 
this heading. Much of the technical content of the guidelines have also 
been discussed in par 6 below, where the main characteristics of a 
successful and workable business rescue model for South Africa are set 
out. 
In par 1 of the UNCITRAL Guide, the following statement is made: 
'1. The purpose of the Guide is to assist in the establishment of an efficient and effective 
framework to address the financial difficulty of debtors. It is intended to be used as a 
reference by national authorities and legislative bodies when preparing new laws or 
reviewing the adequacy of existing laws and regulations. The advice provided in the Guide 
aims at achieving a balance between the need to address the debtor's financial difficulty 
as quickly and efficiently as possible with the interests of the various parties directly 
concerned with that financial difficulty, principally creditors and other parties with a 
stake in the debtor's business, as well as with public policy concerns.' 
In Part One of the UNCITRAL Guide the key objectives and structure 
of an effective and efficient insolvency law are discussed. Although there 
are nine key objectives64 identified by the UNCITRAL Guide, the 
authors realise that balancing these key objectives will be the main 
objective for many jurisdictions, as all the objectives cannot necessarily be 
realised simultaneously:65 
63
 A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.70 (Parts I and II). Both documents may be accessed at http://www. 
globaIinsohency.com/msollintinsohenciesluncilral .html. 
64
 UNCITRAL Guide op cit note 63 in par A. 
65
 Idem in par 23. 
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'23. Since an insolvency regime cannot fully protect the interests of all parties, some of the 
key policy choices to be made when designing an insolvency law relate to defining the 
broad goals of the insolvency law (rescuing businesses in financial difficulty, protecting 
employment, protecting the interests of creditors, encouraging the development of an 
entrepreneurial class) and achieving the desired balance between the specific objectives 
identified above. Insolvency laws achieve that balance by reapportioning the risks of 
insolvency in a way that suits a country's economic, social and political goals. As such an 
insolvency law can have widespread effects in the broader economy.' 
It is the balancing of these key objectives that will form the main 
challenge when designing a new business rescue model for South Africa. 
In South Africa there are a number of important issues that need 
balancing, one example being the protection of employees as opposed to, 
say, the downsizing of a business in order to keep it operating as a 
company, or at least as a going concern. The balancing of these issues will 
be discussed in more depth when dealing with the main elements of a 
business rescue model in the South African context. 
Part 1 of the U N C I T R A L Guide is divided into three separate sections. 
Section I is an introductory section dealing with the key objectives of an 
effective and efficient insolvency law, the balancing of the key objectives 
and the general features of an insolvency law. 
Section II of the U N C I T R A L Guide briefly deals with the mechanisms 
for resolving a debtor's financial difficulties, namely voluntary 
restructuring negotiations,66 insolvency proceedings67 and administra-
tive processes.68 
Section III of the U N C I T R A L Guide deals with institutional frame-
works within which the insolvency laws are applied. This aspect is of 
critical importance in South Africa, especially in light of the Unified 
Insolvency and Business Recovery Bil l that has already been approved by 
the South African Cabinet. This aspect will be discussed separately below. 
Part 2 of the U N C I T R A L Guide forms the bulk of it and deals with the 
core provisions for an effective and efficient insolvency law. These core 
provisions will be dealt with under par 6 below, and will not be dealt with 
in any detail here. 
4.2 Mechanisms for Resolving a Debtor's Financial Difficulties 
As stated above, Section II of the U N C I T R A L Guide deals with three 
main themes under this heading, namely voluntary restructuring 
negotiations,69 insolvency proceedings70 and administrative pro-
cesses.71 In this article the focus wil l be on insolvency proceedings 
66
 This aspect will be briefly referred to in this article. 
67
 In this article the emphasis will be on 'insolvency proceedings' which encapsulates the formal 
proceedings for both business rescue and formal liquidation. 
68
 Administrative processes refer mainly to procedures that are in place to address systemic 
risk, and will not be dealt with in this article. The recent collapse of Saambou Bank is an example 
of the implementation of 'administrative processes', as the bank was placed under curatorship in 
terms of banking legislation. These types of procedures are highly specialised and are dealt with in 
separate legislation. 
69
 UNCITRAL Guide op cit note 63 at II A pars 31-46. 
70
 Idem at II B pars 47-69. 
71
 Idem at II C pars 70-1. 
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which encompass both the formal liquidation provisions as well as the 
formal business rescue ('reorganization') proceedings. However, due to 
the increasing popularity of informal creditor workouts in South Africa, 
a brief reference has been made to this aspect here. 
4.2.1 Voluntary Restructuring Negotiations 
This is probably better known as 'informal creditor workouts' in South 
Africa and by all accounts seems to be taking place with more and more 
frequency in South Africa.72 This aspect is discussed in the UNCITRAL 
Guide in some detail73 as one of the mechanisms for resolving a debtor's 
financial difficulties. 
Although South Africa should be aiming towards making proposals 
for a formal business rescue model, it is worth mentioning that the 
insolvency laws and legal framework of a country will to a large extent 
determine the success rate of informal creditor workouts.74 While there 
are a number of advantages to be gained from the use of informal 
creditor workouts,75 there are also a number of disadvantages when used 
under the South African insolvency regime. Examples of these 
disadvantages are: 
• any efforts to enter into a compromise with creditors outside the 
current legislative provisions may lead to the formal processes of 
insolvency being implemented; 
• no moratorium is created; 
• other (normally smaller) creditors cannot be bound by the informal 
procedures and/or agreements which in turn can lead to the 
implementation of the formal insolvency laws by such creditors (in 
other words there is no 'cram-down' provision that can be enforced); 
• downsizing of the debtor's workforce is often required in order to make 
the restructuring a success, something that may be difficult taking into 
consideration South Africa's stringent labour laws. 
While informal creditor workouts are likely to remain just that -
informal - it is submitted that the available guidelines should be 
disseminated amongst financial institutions in order to encourage them to 
take a more supportive role when debtors find themselves in financial 
distress.76 It is submitted that this will go a long way to instilling a culture 
of business rescue in South Africa. 
11
 The fact that use is made of such informal procedures is taken as being indicative of the fact 
that a country has a 'rescue culture': idem in par 31. 
71
 Idem in par II A . 
74
 Idem in par 32. 
5
 For example, flexibility (by reducing the burden on the judicial infrastructure), obtaining an 
earlier pro-active response from creditors than would be the case under formal insolvency 
proceedings, and the avoidance of the stigma that normally attaches to insolvency: idem in par 32. 
76
 For more information on this aspect, see U N C I T R A L Guide op cit note 63 in (Part 1) par II A . 
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4.2.2 Insolvency Proceedings 
4.2.2.1 Introduction 
According to the UNCITRAL Guide two main types of proceedings 
are common to the insolvency laws of most jurisdictions, namely business 
rescue ('reorganizations') and liquidation.77 It is further stated that the 
traditional distinction or division between these two types of proceedings 
can be artificial, creating 'unnecessary polarization and inflexibility'.78 
Consequently the UNCITRAL Guide suggests that 
'it is desirable that an insolvency law provides more than a choice between a single, 
narrowly defined type of reorganization and strictly traditional liquidation. Since the 
concept of reorganization can accommodate a variety of arrangements, it is desirable that 
an insolvency law adopt an approach that is not prescriptive and supports arrangements 
that will achieve a result that provides more value to creditors than if the debtor was 
liquidated.'79 
This paragraph appears to imply that not only should the liquidation 
and business rescue provisions be encompassed within the same 
legislation, but it should also be flexible enough not to prescribe any 
specific mode in given circumstances. For example, even though a 
company may have been liquidated, the procedures should be designed in 
such a way that the liquidator can use the business rescue provisions 
insofar as it will allow him or her to bring about a more beneficial return 
to the creditors. 
On a different level, especially with a view to designing a business rescue 
model in the South African context, it is important to note that the business 
rescue provisions should in fact form part of South Africa's insolvency 
legislation. There is a certain school of thought, especially within the 
Department of Trade and Industry that business rescue legislation should 
be separated from the insolvency laws and rather be encompassed within 
the company laws of the country. Clearly this is not an international trend, 
and therefore one of the first policy decisions that will need to be taken will 
be where the business rescue provisions will be included. In view of the 
stance taken in the UNCITRAL Guide, it seems clear that these should in 
fact be included in the Unified Insolvency and Business Recovery Bill. This 
aspect will be addressed in more detail in par 6 below. 
Under the next subheadings the main thrust of business rescue 
proceedings, expedited business rescue proceedings, liquidation and the 
organisation of the insolvency laws, are discussed. The main issues that 
are addressed are the underlying core objectives of each of these facets of 
insolvency, and will form the basis upon which the business rescue 
provisions should be inserted and regulated within the insolvency regime 
in South Africa. In a nutshell, this part of the article provides the 
framework, or 'bigger picture', in terms of which the introduction of a 
modern and effective business rescue model should be seen. 
Idem in par 47. 
Idem in par 48. 
Idem in par 49. 
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4.2.2.2 Business Rescue ('Reorganization') Proceedings 
The main points made by the U N C I T R A L Guide regarding a business 
rescue model or proceeding, are the following:80 
• one of the means of resolving a debtor's financial difficulties is a 
reorganisation that is designed to save a company or, failing that, the 
business of such company;81 
• the process of reorganisation may take one of several forms;82 
• the form a process of reorganisation takes may be more varied as to its 
concept, acceptance and application than the process of liquidation in 
which it is applied;83 
• the term 'reorganisation' is used in its wide sense to refer to the type of 
proceedings in terms of which its ultimate purpose is to allow the 
debtor to overcome its financial woes and resume or continue normal 
commercial operations;84 
• not all debtors that falter or experience financial difficulties in a 
competitive marketplace should necessarily be liquidated;85 
• a debtor with a reasonable prospect of survival should be given an 
opportunity to recover where it can be shown that there is greater value 
in keeping the essential business and other component parts of the 
debtor together;86 
• business rescue proceedings are designed to provide a debtor with some 
breathing space to recover from its temporary liquidity difficulties or 
more permanent over-indebtedness and, if and where necessary, 
provide such debtor with an opportunity to restructure its operations 
and its relations with creditors;87 
• generally speaking, where business rescue is possible it will be preferred 
by creditors i f the value obtained from the continued operation of the 
debtor's business will enhance the value of their claims;88 
• business rescue does not imply that all of the stakeholders must be 
wholly protected, or that they should be restored to the financial or 
commercial position that would have obtained had the event of 
insolvency not occurred;89 
• business rescue does not imply that the debtor will be completely 
restored, or that its creditors will be paid in full, or that the ownership 
and management of an insolvent debtor will be retained and preserve 
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• management may be terminated and changed; 
• the equity of shareholders may be reduced to nothing;92 
• employees may be retrenched;93 
• the source of a market for suppliers may disappear;94 
• a business rescue model does, however, imply that whatever forms the 
rescue proceeding may take, the creditors will eventually receive more 
than if the debtor was liquidated.95 
The UNCITRAL Guide then lists the following as additional factors 
that support the use of a business rescue proceeding:96 
• the modern economy has significantly reduced the degree to which the 
value of a debtor's assets can be maximised by means of liquidation;97 
• in circumstances where technical expertise and goodwill are more 
important than physical assets, the preservation of human resources 
and business relations are essential elements of value that cannot be 
realised through liquidation;98 
• long-term economic benefit is more likely to be achieved through 
business rescue proceedings, as they encourage debtors to seek 
assistance before their financial difficulties become too severe;" 
• there may be social and political considerations that are served by the 
availability or business rescue proceedings. An example of this is the 
protection that can be provided, say, to the employees of a debtor. 10° 
The UNCITRAL Guide is also at pains to point out that 'business 
rescue' may take different forms.101 These are referred to as being the 
following: 
• a simple agreement concerning debts (a composition or compromise) in 
terms of which the creditors agree to receive a predetermined 
percentage of the debt owed to them as full and final settlement of 
the claim (the remainder of the debt is written off, the debtor becomes 
solvent and can continue to trade);102 and 
• a complex reorganisation in terms of which debts are restructured, the 
conversion of debt to equity together with a reduction of existing 
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Hereafter the U N C I T R A L Guide sets out a number o f key elements 
that are common to most business rescue models. Due to the importance 
of these key elements (they form the basis of the discussion under par 6 
below), they are reflected in full below:104 
• submission of the debtor to the business rescue proceedings (whether it 
is by the debtor's own accord or by an application brought by the 
creditors), and which may or may not involve judicial involvement or 
supervision;105 
• automatic and mandatory moratorium ('stay'), or a suspension of 
actions and proceedings against the assets of the debtor, that applies to 
all the creditors of the debtor for a limited period of time;106 
• continuation of the business of the debtor, which can either be by the 
existing management of the debtor, an independent manager or a 
combination of the two;107 
• the formulation of a plan that proposes the manner in which creditors, 
equity holders and the debtor itself will be treated;108 
• consideration of the plan by creditors, voting on the plan and the 
acceptance thereof (or not) by creditors;109 
• the possible judicial approval or confirmation of an accepted plan;"° 
• implementation of the p l an . ' ' ' 
The point is also made that the mere existence of liquidation provisions 
within the insolvency laws will serve as an incentive to all the relevant 
parties to ensure the best possible chance of the business rescue 
proceeding being a success.11' 
4.2.2.3 Expedited Business Rescue ('Reorganization') Proceedings 
The U N C I T R A L Guide makes a brief reference to what is termed 
'expedited reorganization proceedings'.113 This is a reference to what the 
Guide terms 'pre-insolvency' or 'pre-packaged' procedures. One example 
used is where the jurisdiction concerned permits proceedings to be 
commenced to obtain formal court approval of a reorganisation plan that 
was negotiated voluntarily and approved by creditors through a vote that 
occurred before the commencement of the proceedings. These proceed-
ings are designed to minimise the cost and delay associated with formal 
reorganisation proceedings while at the same time providing a means by 
which a reorganisation plan negotiated voluntarily can nevertheless be 
approved in the absence of unanimous support of the creditors. 
104


















 Idem in pars 58-60. 
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The procedure mentioned would appear to be very similar to the 
current compromises and arrangements that may be entered into in terms 
of s 311 of the Companies Act, and is therefore not a new concept in the 
South African context. The proposed 'pre-liquidation composition', 
currently inserted as a separate chapter in the Unified Insolvency and 
Business Recovery Bill, will also fall under this category. 
4.2.2.4 Liquidation 
The distinction drawn between business rescue proceedings and 
liquidation proceedings by the U N C I T R A L Guide is best stated with 
reference to the following paragraph: 
'61. The type of proceedings referred to as "liquidation" are regulated by the insolvency 
law and generally provide for a public authority . . . to take charge of the debtor's assets, 
with a view to terminating the commercial activity of the debtor, transforming non-
monetary assets into monetary form and subsequently distributing the proceeds of sale or 
realization of the assets proportionately to creditors. Although generally requiring the 
sale or realization of assets to occur in a piecemeal manner as quickly as possible, some 
insolvency laws permit liquidation to involve sale of the business in productive units or as 
a going concern; under other laws that is only permissible in reorganization. Liquidation 
usually results in the dissolution or disappearance of the debtor as a commercial legal 
entity.'114 
The U N C I T R A L Guide then addresses the most common features of a 
liquidation proceeding.115 Due to the fact that South African legislation, 
both current and proposed, complies with all these common features, 
they will not be repeated here. However, the U N C I T R A L Guide goes 
further, and sets out a number of legal and economic justifications for the 
existence of a liquidation proceeding.116 These are important within the 
context of proposed new South African legislation, and bear repeating 
here: 
• A commercial business that is unable to compete in a market economy 
should be removed from the marketplace.I17 
• A principal identifying mark of an uncompetitive business is one that 
satisfies one of the tests of insolvency, namely that it is unable to meet 
its mature debts as they become due, or its debts exceed its assets.U8 
• Liquidation proceedings can be seen as addressing inter-creditor 
problems, and as a disciplinary force that is an essential element of a 
sustainable debtor-creditor relationship (in other words liquidation, as 
a collective debt collecting procedure, avoids creditors acting in their 
own self-interest while at the same time jeopardising the rights of the 
creditors as a whole. The equitable treatment of the whole group of 
creditors is placed above those of the individual creditors). " 9 
114
 Idem in par 61. 
115
 Idem in par 62. 
116
 Idem in pars 63-4. 
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• An orderly and (relatively) predictable mechanism for the enforcement 
of the collective rights of creditors can also provide creditors with an 
element of predictability at the time they make their lending decisions. 
In addition, such a mechanism can more generally promote the interest 
of all participants in the economy by facilitating the provision of credit 
and the development of financial markets.120 
• Effective insolvency proceedings (liquidation) will ensure that where 
(individual) debt enforcement mechanisms fail, creditors will have an 
avenue of final recourse that can operate as an effective incentive to a 
recalcitrant debtor to encourage payment to the particular creditor.121 
4.2.2.5 Organisation of the Insolvency Law 
Under this heading is meant the structure of the proceedings that leads 
to the choice between a business rescue procedure and a liquidation 
procedure. According to the UNCITRAL Guide there are basically two 
alternatives.122 The first alternative is where the insolvency laws provide 
for 'unitary, flexible insolvency proceedings with a single commencement 
requirement alternatively resulting in liquidation or reorganization, 
depending on the circumstances of the case'.123 The second alternative 
is where the insolvency laws make provision for two distinct proceedings, 
with each proceeding setting out its own access and commencement 
requirements.124 The latter alternative usually also has various 
possibilities for conversion between the two proceedings.125 
It is important to point out that those jurisdictions that treat 
liquidation and business rescue as distinct procedures, do so 'on the 
basis of different social and commercial policy considerations'.i26 
However, just as importantly a considerable number of issues are 
common to both business rescue and liquidation, which may cause 
considerable overlapping both procedurally and as regards the 
substantive law.127 Due to the considerable expense involved in bringing 
proceedings, be it for business rescue or liquidation, it is suggested that 
where this distinction is made there should be linkages between the two 
systems with a view to conversion between them.I28 
Although this question will be addressed in more detail below, one 
does need to ask whether South Africa should adopt a unitary approach 
or whether the two procedures should be separated. In this regard it is 
submitted that South Africa should adopt the approach where business 
rescue and liquidation are kept separate, with a conversion provision 
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allowing for conversion from business rescue to liquidation, and vice 
versa. This statement can be motivated as follows: 
• South Africa has a creditor-friendly insolvency system with an 
established liquidation procedure that provides relief to creditors. 
Many elements of business rescue can already be applied within 
the liquidation regime, such as a s 311 compromise in terms of the 
Companies Act, and it would not make sense to tamper with 
the established rules that have been built up over decades. 
• Considering that very few insolvent entities that have already reached 
the stage where they are so insolvent that they can be liquidated have 
been saved in the past, it is clear that South Africa should provide for a 
system of business rescue where the management of a debtor, for 
example, should seek help long before the entity itself can or should be 
liquidated (in other words before the entity is hopelessly insolvent). A n 
insolvent trading provision, such as the provision that has now been 
included in the Insolvency and Business Recovery Bi l l , can ensure that 
the management of an entity will not trade in insolvent circumstances 
and apply for the requisite assistance in terms of the proposed new 
business rescue model. 
• The fact that there will in all probability be separate panels of 
liquidators and business rescue managers means that the business 
rescue and liquidation procedures will probably have to be kept 
separate from one another. This is resultant from the fact that South 
Africa currently has an unregulated insolvency industry, although this 
problem is currently being addressed. 
Although this aspect will be addressed again in par 6 below, it is 
appropriate at this stage to state that this is another policy decision that 
will need to be taken by government when implementing a new business 
rescue model. 
4.3 Institutional Framework129 
This heading is important when deciding who will supervise the 
introduction of a new business rescue model in South Africa. The only 
existing forms of business rescue in South Africa, namely s 311 
compromises and judicial management, are currently both supervised 
by the courts. The most important point to be made here is that this has 
caused the processes to be extremely expensive to implement, and as a 
result many entities are unable to make use of the processes due to a lack 
of funds. It seems fair to state that South Africa needs a system which is 
inexpensive, cost-efficient and swift in its application. It is doubted 
whether a court supervised process wi l l achieve this, especially 
considering that most businesses in South Africa consist of small to 
medium sized enterprises. 
Idem in pars 72-9. 
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The UNCITRAL Guide makes the following instructive statements 
regarding the importance of the forum in which business rescue will be 
dealt with: 
'73. In most jurisdictions, the insolvency process is administered by a judicial authority, 
often through commercial courts or courts of general jurisdiction or, in a few cases, 
through specialized bankruptcy courts. Sometimes judges have specialized knowledge 
and responsibility only for insolvency matters, while in other cases insolvency matters are 
just one of a number of wider judicial responsibilities. In a few jurisdictions non-judicial 
or quasi-judicial institutions fulfil the role that, in other jurisdictions, is played by the 
courts."* 
and 
'74. In designing the insolvency law it may be appropriate to consider the extent to which 
courts will be required to supervise the process and whether or not their role can be 
limited with respect to different parts of the process or balanced by the role of other 
participants in the process, such as the creditors and the insolvency representative. This is 
of particular importance where the insolvency law requires judges to deal quickly with 
difficult insolvency issues (which often involve commercial and business questions) and 
the capacity of the judiciary is limited, whether because of its size, a general lack of 
resources in the court system or a lack of specific knowledge and experience of the types 
of issues likely to be encountered in insolvency.*131 
There are various issues that need to be weighed when deciding upon 
the involvement of the court in a future business rescue model, but these 
are perhaps better dealt with under par 6 below where the elements of a 
business rescue model are discussed. Suffice it to state that this will be 
another policy consideration that will need to be addressed by 
government. 
5 The World Bank's Principles and Guidelines for Effective 
Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems™2 
Due to the fact that the World Bank collaborated with U N C I T R A L in 
order to produce the UNCITRAL Guide discussed at length in par 4 
above and par 6 below,l33 only a brief reference to this document will be 
made here. The only point that needs to be made is that South Africa 
needs to take cognisance of the principles and guidelines laid down by the 
World Bank in order to ensure that a new business rescue model does in 
fact comply with international criteria. The World Bank document lists 
35 principles that need to be taken cognisance of when looking at an 
effective insolvency and creditors' rights system. All these principles are 
included in some way or another under the U N C I T R A L Guide, and will 
not be repeated here. 
(To be continued.) 
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" The author of this document is Gordon Johnson of the World Bank and is dated 27 Mar 
2001. The document was used in a set of experimental country assessments in connection with the 
program to develop Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), using a 
common template based on the principles, It is to be noted that the World Bank collaborated with 
UNCITRAL in developing the guidelines discussed in par 4 above and par 6 below. 
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